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Chaos Theory Based Detection against
Network Mimicking DDoS Attacks
Ashley Chonka, Member, IEEE, Jaipal Singh, Member, IEEE, and Wanlei Zhou, Member, IEEE
Abstract—DDoS attack traffic is difficult to differentiate from
legitimate network traffic during transit from the attacker, or
zombies, to the victim. In this paper, we use the theory of network
self-similarity to differentiate DDoS flooding attack traffic from
legitimate self-similar traffic in the network. We observed that
DDoS traffic causes a strange attractor to develop in the pattern
of network traffic. From this observation, we developed a neural
network detector trained by our DDoS prediction algorithm. Our
preliminary experiments and analysis indicate that our proposed
chaotic model can accurately and effectively detect DDoS attack
traffic. Our approach has the potential to not only detect attack
traffic during transit, but to also filter it.
Index Terms—Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), anomaly
detection, chaotic models.
I. INTRODUCTION
DENIAL of service (DoS) attacks are designed to disruptnetwork services, by intentionally blocking or degrading
the available resources used by them. One of the major
problems for DDoS detection methods is the difficulty of dif-
ferentiating DDoS attack packets from legitimate packets [1],
since attackers mimic their attack traffic amongst legitimate
traffic in order to hide their attack. This makes DDoS attacks
a very serious threat to computers users [2].
In this paper, we developed a novel prediction algorithm
that can detect DDoS attack packets and give some certainty
of when the attack started. This information is then used by a
trained neural network to drop the DDoS attack packets and
can be used by the relevant authorities to identify the attacker.
The organisation of this paper is as follows: Details of our
proposed Network Anomaly Prediction Algorithm (NAPA) are
provided in section II. Analysis of our simulated network
experiments are discussed in section III. Section IV concludes
the paper.
II. NETWORK ANOMALY PREDICTION ALGORITHM
The use of chaos models to represent network traffic is not
new. Previous research has shown that TCP-based network
traffic has self-similar characteristics [3], [4]. Algorithms to
detect DDoS attack packets from legitimate packets, based on
self-similar characteristics, have been proposed in [5].
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In our approach, we use real network traffic information to
discover the self-similar pattern for legitimate traffic, and use
this information as a benchmark for our prediction algorithm,
to determine if any new traffic that enters the network is
DDoS traffic or legitimate traffic. Our trained neural network
system will filter out any anomalous traffic that fits the
DDoS characteristics. We present our self similar network
traffic model and DDoS prediction algorithms in the following
sections.
A. Self Similar Network Model
Our model requires that all network traffic be sampled so
that a self similar phase space graph can be generated of the
network. We pick the state of traffic that contains normal (Xn)
and attack traffic (Xa).
Xn + 1 = f(Xn) (1)
Xa + 1 = f(Xa) (2)
Where f(X) maps the nonlinear function dimension of the
input variables, which is the same as the dimension of output
variables.
From (1) and (2) we generate a sequence of the form:
Xn0, Xn1, Xn2, Xn3, . . . , XnN (3)
Xn0 + ΔXn0, Xn1 + +ΔXn1, . . . , XnN + ΔXnN (4)
Xa0 + ΔXn0, Xa1 + +ΔXn1, . . . , XnN + ΔXaN (5)
The sequence (3) (4) are the orbit or trajectory of (1),
representing normal traffic and changed traffic due to new
traffic or bursty legitimate traffic. Equation (5) is the orbit
or trajectory of normal traffic changes to attack traffic, given
in (2).
We now consider the two points in space, legitimate traffic
(self similar) = Xn0, and attack traffic = Xa0 + ΔXn0. We
assume that network traffic attracts to fixed points, which
diminishes asymptotically with time ΔXn(Xn0, t). We further
assume in our model that at any time the normal traffic orbit
diverges exponentially but eventually settles, it is either due to
new traffic entering the system or a burst of legitimate traffic.
This behavior is modeled in (4).
If the function ΔXn(Xn0, t) behaves ’chaotically’ when
new traffic enters the network, the function is changed to
ΔXa(Xa0, t) and the new traffic is assumed to be IP spoofed
DDoS attack traffic.
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TABLE I
NETWORK ANOMALY PREDICTION ALGORITHM
1. Collect normal network traffic packets and flow information.
2. Calculate self similar traffic, based on f(x) time sequence.
3. Train neural network on self similar traffic.
4. New traffic enters the network and changes the orbit (anomaly).
5. Use Lyapunov Equation to predict the network anomaly:
If λmax < 1 then traffic changes are due to legitimate traffic.
If λmax = 1 then recalculate point on new self similar traffic.
If λmax > 1 then traffic changes are due to DDoS attack.
6. Train defense system on strange attractor traffic, ΔXa(Xa0, t)
7. Filter DDoS attack packets.
B. Anomaly Prediction Algorithm
Based on the assumptions above, we study the mean ex-
ponential rate of divergence between these two close orbits
(normal and new traffic to see if it is attack traffic) by using
the Lyapunov Exponent [6].
λmax = lim
x→∞
1
t
ln
|ΔX(Xn0, t)|
|ΔXn0| (6)
If λmax < 1, network traffic orbits attract to a stable fixed
point from when they diverge due to new legitimate traffic, or
bursty legitimate traffic, entering the system. This means that
the change in the network phase space graph is not caused by
DDoS attack traffic.
If λmax = 1, the phase space graph is in a steady state
(neural fixed point). This event means that the introduced
network traffic has moved the self similar network traffic
line either up and down, thus becoming the new standard for
detecting attack traffic.
If λmax > 1, the network traffic orbit is chaotic and
unstable, which means the nearby points will diverge to any
arbitrary separation. This is representation of attack traffic that
was introduced by an attacker into the system. This means
that ΔXn(Xn0, t) changes to ΔXa(Xa0, t). This network
traffic is considered to be DDoS attack traffic and dropped
by our neural network trained filters. We present our network
anomaly prediction algorithm in Table I.
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We simulated our proposed anomaly prediction algorithm
(Table I) by using a real DDoS dataset, DARPA LLS DDoS-
1.0 dataset, available from MIT [7]. From this dataset, we
generated a time series graph (Fig. 1) from the source IP
address, which shows self-similar (Spoof free) traffic and
attack traffic (Spoofed) in the network. From Fig. 1, we see
that attack traffic closely follows the self similar (normal
traffic) line, until the full attack commences, which diverges
the line greatly at around 11.25pm. This clearly shows that
the network is sensitive to the anomaly and since the attack
line did not return to the steady state, we know this is some
form of attack. This data fits with our Lyapunov prediction
Equation Λmax > 1.
To further our analysis, we insert our data into a phase
space graph (Fig. 2), which gives us a clearer picture of
network traffic. Fig. 2 displays normal traffic (top right hand
corner) and the attack traffic in the bottom left hand corner.
Using Lyapunov Stability 78 [8], where V (x) is the Lyapunov
Fig. 1. Time series graph of self-similar normal traffic and DDoS attack
traffic in the network.
Fig. 2. Phase Space graph for DDoS flooding attack traffic in the network,
where X(t + delay) over X(t).
Function candidate (and if V (x) = 0 or is not a negative
definite 8). What can be said about our predictions is that if
the attack continues against the network, then its final resting
state will show a slow down, moving towards total collapse.
This final resting state is called a strange attractor, which is
clearly shown at the bottom left hand corner of Fig. 2.
V (x) ≥ 0 equal to positive definite (7)
V (x(t)) < 0 equal to negative definite (8)
With the strange attractor, we trained our back-propagation
neural network to detect it, with the trained settings of 4
Neuron Layers (3,3,3,1), Learning Rate of 0.2, Momentum
of 0.6, and a variable threshold of 0.1 to 0.9, which was
incrementally increased by 0.1, and we know that it was
trained successfully, since we compared the attack curve
with the trained strange attractor curve shown in Bifurcation
diagram (Fig. 3).
From the results in Fig. 3, we can see that our neural
network follows the strange attractor curve quite accurately,
with some slight variation. To further our analysis of accuracy,
detection time and time to filter attack traffic by our neural
network, we used our relative sensitivity 9 and false positives
10 measures. Sensitivity (S) is measured by the number of
detected attack packets (D) over the total number of packets,
and the false positive rate (FPR) is measured by how many
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Fig. 3. Bifurcation diagram of trained Neural Network to detect strange
attractor (attack) at r = 3.68.
Fig. 4. Sensitivity of Neural Network, where the number of detected packets
is over the total of number of packets scanned.
attack packets were detected as normal packets (ND), over
the total number of attack packets.
S =
D
TD
(9)
FPR =
ND
TND
(10)
Overall, our Neural Network performed remarkably well
(Fig. 4) as expected, with the sensitivity range of 88% to 94%,
with a false positive range 0.05% to 0.45%. We furthered our
results with another phase space, Fig. 5, which displayed our
best performance (94%) of filtering the attack traffic. Based on
our simulations, we conclude, that with any large introduction
of spoof network traffic (such as a DDoS flooding attack) it
will alter the network phase space graph. With this alteration,
we can use our Lyapunov Exponent, to predict if a strange
attractor (DDoS attack) will develop. If one does, our trained
Neural Network will assume that this is DDoS attack and filter
the traffic to protect the system.
We further this conclusion by seeing at point A, in Fig.
5, confirms that detection of attack traffic starts within a few
seconds of becoming aware that network traffic deviation, in
which our neural network begins to filter the attack traffic
out. One interesting result is at points B and C in Fig. 5,
which displays these large gaps where our Neural Network had
filtered the attack traffic. This suggests a possibility that our
Neural Network could possible be re-trained and its settings
re-adjusted to further filter out more of the attack traffic.
Fig. 5. Filtered DDoS attack traffic from our Neural Network. Point A
displays where the Neural Network started to filter the attack traffic.
We further this conclusion by seeing at point A, in Fig.
5, confirms that detection of attack traffic starts within a few
seconds of becoming aware of network traffic deviation, in
which our neural network begins to filter the attack traffic
out. One interesting result is at points B and C in Fig. 5,
which displays these large gaps where our Neural Network had
filtered the attack traffic. This suggests a possibility that our
Neural Network could possibly be re-trained and its settings
re-adjusted to further filter out more of the attack traffic.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a new algorithm that can predict the
nature of network traffic in a dynamic system. Our algorithm
detects whether a strange attractor caused by the introduced
network traffic returns to the steady state, thus is bursty
legitimate traffic, or greatly diverges from the steady state,
identifying such traffic as caused by DDoS flooding attack.
We have shown through simulations that DDoS attacks can be
detected since they cause the network phase space to change.
We are currently using neural networks to implement our
prediction algorithm in order to filter DDoS attack traffic.
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